At the time of writing, The Art of War ranked fourth on Amazon’s ‘Strategy & Competition1’ bestseller list. So why do modern strategists continue to turn to this 2,500 year-old Chinese military treatise for insights? The answer may be that war and business share two fundamental characteristics:
- Competition with rivals
- Uncertainty — arising from the not knowing the intentions or actions of competitors.
Yet, despite its popularity, many business strategists today treat this work as little more than a source of pithy quotes to sprinkle their presentations with. As Derek M. C. Yuen wryly observed, “The Art of War is often heard of and read but seldom understood in the West2” since most Westerners lack an understanding of the Chinese philosophical tradition that both shaped Sun Tzu’s classic and reveals its strategic depth.
Fig.15: The Art of War, Sun Tzu
The Art of War
The opening line of The Art of War states that “war is a vital matter of state”. Yet, paradoxically, this work emerged from “a culture in which warfare is neither celebrated nor glorified, and in which military heroism is a rather undeveloped idea3”. The Chinese recognised that all wars, even victorious ones, are devastating as they drain resources from crucial areas like infrastructure, education and culture on which future prosperity depends. In the Chinese tradition therefore, war was seen only as an act of last resort.
However, China’s endless history also taught them that war is unavoidable. Therefore, any leader who does not study warfare is irresponsible. This pragmatism explains why “many if not most of the classical Chinese philosophical works contain lengthy treatises on military thought4”. Yet, the Chinese study of warfare is less about winning on the battlefield and more about winning without needing a battlefield and The Art of War is a high-point of this approach:
"To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all” — The Art of War (chapter 3)
As the world's longest continuous civilisation, China retains an “intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy5” and Chinese leaders can invoke “strategic principles from a millennium-old event” and feel confident others will “understand the significance of [these] allusions”. When China faced threats from a hostile Soviet Union to the North and an ambitious Vietnam to the South, Mao Zedong resolved this peril by invoking the principle of “defeating the near barbarians with the assistance of the far barbarians6”. Mao’s 1972 rapprochement with the ‘far barbarians’ (the USA) reduced the threat from the ‘near barbarians’ on China’s borders by leveraging their mutual antagonisms, keeping them focused on each other, rather than China. Mao’s openness to the US surprised many foreigner observers, but his reference to a successful stratagem from Chinese history would have clearly and succinctly communicated his intention to his own people that, ultimately, helped create the stable conditions China needed to re-emerge as a great power.
The challenge for modern (non-Chinese) strategists is how to extract strategic insights from The Art of War if they’re unfamiliar with the long historical and philosophical traditions that shaped it? The long answer would be to learn Chinese and study their classical texts. A more pragmatic answer is to examine some of the key principles in The Art of War and explore how they influence the Eastern approach to strategy.
Shi (勢)
Shi has been described as the “key and defining idea7” in The Art of War. Like many concepts in Chinese — a highly-contextual language where meaning depends on the situation — shi has no direct translation. However, we can grasp its essence through the metaphors, often drawn from nature, Chinese philosophers used to explain these subtle concepts. Laozi, a contemporary of Sun Tzu, wrote: “Nothing in the world is more flexible and yielding than water. Yet when it attacks the firm and the strong, none can withstand it, because they have no way to change it”8. Laozi’s metaphor compares shi to water — adapting to the terrain, taking no permanent shape, so it cannot be attacked directly, giving it time to accumulate sufficient force upstream that its downstream flow eventually creates irresistible, inevitable outcomes:
“The velocity of cascading water can send boulders bobbing about is due to its strategic advantage [shi]” — The Art of War (chapter 5)
We can understand shi as the accumulation and release of potential in a given situation. And strategic advantage comes from working with this potential, rather than against it, as an old Taoist story illustrates:
An old man accidentally fell into a river with dangerous rapids. The current immediately pulled him under and onlookers feared for his life. Yet, he reappeared later downstream, unharmed. When the relived onlookers, who had lost sight of him, asked how he survived, he explained: "I adapt to the water, not the water to me. I let myself be shaped by it. Plunging into the swirl, I come out with the swirl. This is how I have survived long enough to become an old man”.
This story reveals two key principles needed for harnessing strategic advantage (shi):
- Awareness: Recognising the potential (threats and opportunities) in a situation.
- Adaptiveness: Responding with this potential, rather than against it.
In Chinese philosophy, even highly-uncertain situations are thought to unfold “according to a general pattern that can not only be anticipated, but can be manipulated to one's advantage9”. This requires cultivating both awareness and adaptiveness to create beneficial consequences: Actively waiting10for favourable conditionsto form (awareness); then exploiting the inherent potential in the situation with the right action and timing (adaptiveness). This is the source of competitive advantage at the heart of the Eastern approach to strategy.
Intelligence
However, in the Chinese philosophical tradition, no two situations can be considered entirely identical as “minute fluctuations can amplify into dramatic changes11”. Therefore, there are no universal recipes to follow. Instead, wise commanders must continually improve their awareness of the current situation, extracting rich information from commonly recurring patterns: Troops leaning on their weapons as a sign of tiredness, suggesting they’re ripe for being attacked; birds gathering in trees pointing to unoccupied positions in enemy lines that can be exploited12. Yet, a wise commander must also be alert to deception — an enemy who makes you think they’re distant when they’re near, or too tired to fight when they’re well rested and ready for battle:
“Warfare is the art of deceit” — The Art of War (chapter 1)
Ever changing conditions and pervasive uncertainty explains why wise commanders do not allow those far away — political commanders or advisors — to influence decision-making at the frontline. Those far from the frontline lack real-time information and therefore tend to re-fight the last war. This makes their strategic moves predictable and more easily countered by commanders who take their intelligence “directly from the specific situation” and use it to enhance their "capacity to thus control events13”:
“Intelligence is of the essence in warfare — it is what the armies depend upon in their every move” — The Art of War (chapter 13)
Five Factors
Sun Tzu provided a framework of ‘Five Factors’ commanders can use to assess the potential in a situation and ‘anticipate victory14’ — he was clear about its importance:
“All commanders are familiar with these five factors, yet it is he who masters them who takes the victory, while he who does not will not prevail” — The Art of War (chapter 1)
The First Factor is tao — or the Way15 — which is concerned with how well-aligned troops are with their commander around a common direction or purpose.
The Second Factor is climate, which is concerned with the rotation of days and seasons.
The Third Factor is terrain, which is concerned with the physical landscape and distances involved, as well as how these may be affected by changes in climate.
The Fourth Factor is command, which is concerned with the decisions a commander makes — after considering tao, climate and terrain — based on their “wisdom, integrity, humanity, courage, and discipline16”.
The Final Factor concerns regulations, which determine how effectively a commander’s forces can respond to different situations through “organisational effectiveness, a chain of command, and … logistical support17”.
The Fourth Factor is command, which is concerned with the decisions a commander makes — after considering tao, climate and terrain — based on their “wisdom, integrity, humanity, courage, and discipline16”.
The Final Factor concerns regulations, which determine how effectively a commander’s forces can respond to different situations through “organisational effectiveness, a chain of command, and … logistical support17”.
Wise commanders use the Five Factors to anticipate whom conditions favour more:
- The side with the more compelling mission.
- The side that benefits most from climate conditions.
- The side the terrain favours more.
- The side that makes better decisions.
- The side with the more effective force.
And wise commanders use the Five Factors to harness strategic advantage (shi) from conditions by:
- Making moves that directly fulfil the overall mission. This is seeking shi from the Way.
- Using changes in overhead conditions, such as darkness or heavy rain, to conceal the movement of forces so they can act undetected. This is seeking shi from climate.
- Manoeuvring forces to narrow terrain, which can be defended with few men, even against a numerically superior army. This is seeking shi from the terrain.
- Recognising that bravery and cowardice do not come from the troops themselves but from how wisely they’re deployed. This is seeking shi from command.
- Cultivating the morale of troops so they fight with energy, while taking every opportunity to disturb the equilibrium of rival troops and, thereby, dishearten them. This is seeking shi from regulations.
Victory therefore doesn’t come from daring or courage but from shi. This is The Art of Strategic Advantage:
“The expert at battle [is one who] seeks his victory from strategic advantage (shi) and does not demand it from his men” — The Art of War (chapter 5)
Conclusion
Chinese philosophers understood that “unforeseen circumstances may arise” in any situation, meaning “it is not always possible to draw up a plan in advance18”. This is why commanders, in the Chinese philosophical tradition, are encouraged to cultivate superior awareness. Awareness helps them identify the potential (shi) in changing situations, while they can tip the scales further in their favour by using deception to hinder their rivals’ awareness — creating a mis-match between reality and their rivals’ perception of it. Commanders are also encouraged to develop adaptiveness in their forces ahead of time to ensure they can respond effectively — making the right moves at the right time — to harness the potential in a situation. When their attack comes, it’s like a raging torrent crashing down a gorge, impossible to resist:
“The strategist mastering shi is akin to water flowing downhill, automatically finding the swiftest and easiest course. A successful commander waits before charging headlong into battle. He shies away from an enemy’s strength; he spends his time observing and cultivating changes in the strategic landscape. He studies the enemy’s preparations and his morale, husbands resources and defines them carefully, and plays on his opponent’s psychological weaknesses — until at last he perceives the opportune moment to strike the enemy at his weakest point. He then deploys his resources swiftly and suddenly, rushing “downhill” along the path of least resistance, in an assertion of superiority that careful timing and preparation have rendered a fait accompli19”.
2 Deciphering Sun Tzu. Derek M. C. Yuen. (2014) p.3
3 Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare (Introduction by Roger Ames) p.31
4 Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare (Introduction by Roger Ames) p.31
5 On China. Kissinger (2011) P21
6 On China. Kissinger (2011) p93
7 Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare (translated by Roger Ames) p.50
8 Tao Te Ching (Chapter 78)
9 Deciphering Sun Tzu. Derek M. C. Yuen. (2014) p.53
10 Making a constant, rigorous effort to understand the truth of the current situation, how it’s changing and where your options for action might be.
11 Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare (Introduction by Roger Ames) p.62
12 The Art of War, chapter 9
13 Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare (Introduction by Roger Ames) p.63
14 The Art of War, chapter 3
15 Again, another very difficult concept to translate simply.
16 The Art of War, chapter 1
17 The Art of War, chapter 1
18 Deciphering Sun Tzu. Derek M. C. Yuen. (2014) p.82
19 On China. Kissinger (2011) p54